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MANAGING WATER RIGHTS USING 
FISHING RIGHTS AS A MODEL 
SHELLEY ROSS SAXER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Water sustains life.  Living creatures, plants, and habitats compete 
for sustenance, while the relationships among these interests intertwine 
when we view water from the human lens.  Water supports fish, and fish 
provide culture, beauty, and nutrition.  Water also supports natural 
habitats, plant life, living creatures, and crops to feed the world.  
Additionally, water creates hydropower, supports industrial processes, 
carries away waste, and cleanses the bodies of all forms of life.  When 
there is insufficient water to support these needs, competition becomes 
fierce and many life-affecting choices must be made.  But who will make 
these choices? 
Historically, when water was abundant, it was distributed based 
upon first-in-time concepts.1  Similarly, when the ocean was bountiful, 
fishermen could take whatever they could capture.  The public trust 
doctrine serves as the governing legal framework for managing both of 
these resources. 
Water is fluid and too unlike land to be treated as a property interest 
held by private parties.  Instead, the public trust doctrine provides that 
water should be held by the state in trust for the public good.2  The right 
to use water owned by the public is analogous to the right to use other 
natural resources, and such a right to use should be considered a 
 
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.  B.S., 1980, Pepperdine 
University, Seaver College; J.D., 1989, University of California Los Angeles.  The author 
thanks Professor Kali Murray for her invitation to participate in this AALS symposium.  The 
author also thanks Professor David Sandino for his expert review and helpful comments, as 
well as Erica Deutsch and Jennifer Lisankis for their excellent research and editing assistance. 
1. Tom Tietenberg, Tradable Permits in Principle and Practice, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 251, 270 (2006). 
2. See, e.g., Esplanade Properties, LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(noting that under Washington law, the public trust doctrine reserves a public property 
interest in tidelands and the waters flowing over them for the public good, and despite the 
sale of these lands into private ownership, the state may not give away or convey this 
interest). 
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revocable license or permit.3  Given that environmental changes make 
water an unstable resource from season to season and year to year, a 
method is needed to figure out how water rights should be allocated.  
One option is to look to another natural resource with similar 
characteristics: fish.4  Fish are not confined to a set location, they do not 
observe state or national boundaries, and their numbers vary from 
season to season and year to year, requiring management and allocation 
in times of scarcity. 
A water right is a usufructuary right and, although it entitles the 
right holder to “a vested interest in that right, the right itself is 
something less than the full ownership of property because it is a right 
not to the corpus of the water but to the use of the water.”5  Because the 
right is defined as a usufruct, the water user has a right to enjoy the 
water, but the property ownership belongs to the state.6  In Estate of 
Hage v. United States (Hage V), the Court of Federal Claims explained 
this with a comparison to real property: 
 
It is important to . . . note the difference between water 
 
3. See Jan G. Laitos & Richard A. Westfall, Government Interference with Private 
Interests in Public Resources, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (“A private party may 
also acquire from the federal government the revocable right to use a public resource, often 
to the exclusion of others, in the form of a license or permit.”).  The appropriative system, 
which most states use to allocate water rights, establishes that water rights are not connected 
with land ownership, and that the first person to use the water for a beneficial purpose has the 
right to continue using the same quality of water for that same purpose.  Montana v. 
Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2011).  Thus, the first-in-time concept of distribution is an 
integral part of this system.  See Tietenberg, supra note 1, at 270.  The appropriative doctrine, 
however, differs from the riparian system: the riparian system allocates water based upon 
whoever owns the land that abuts the water source, so the first-in-time concept does not apply 
to a pure riparian system.  Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the United 
States, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 53, 55 (2011); Todd S. Hageman, Note, Franco-American 
Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Board: The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s Resurrection of 
Riparian Rights Leaves Municipal Water Supplies High and Dry, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 183, 184 
(1994). 
4. See Tietenberg, supra note 1, at 268. 
5. Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (holding that the 
valuable nature of the privilege to graze, which would ultimately ripen into a permit under 
the Act, was subject to equitable protection against an illegal act); see also Sandra B. Zellmer 
& Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA. L. REV. 679, 697 (2008) (“[A] 
water right does not constitute ownership of the water itself; it is instead usufructuary, or ‘a 
right to use water.’” (quoting John C. Peck, Title and Related Considerations in Conveying 
Kansas Water Rights, J. KAN. B.A., Nov. 1997, at 38, 39)). 
6. For example, “under California law[,] the title to water always remains with the 
state.”  Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 318 (2001). 
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ownership and real property ownership; water is a usufructuary 
as opposed to a possessory right.  Whereas real property 
ownership is defined by a right to exclude others from that 
property, water ownership is defined by the right to access and 
use that water.7 
 
Government ownership of this public communal resource obligates the 
sovereign, as a trustee, to protect the resource for the public.8  
Government ownership may also facilitate efficient use by private 
individuals through the use of market principles.9 
As with fishing rights, the right to use water should be treated as a 
revocable license.  Under this method, the government would hold 
water in trust.  The public trust system requires a usage fee from all 
private actors wishing to use the public resource.10  If the government 
permits a private individual or entity to enjoy a public resource—such as 
water, fish, wildlife, grazing, timber, minerals, or other public rights held 
in trust—ownership is not conferred, but instead the user would pay the 
public for this right.  This Article addresses the need to view water rights 
as licenses subject to government revocation, without just compensation, 
in the same way that fishing rights are viewed as licenses subject to 
government management. 
The methods for managing and allocating water vary by state and 
region.11  Similarly, the methods for managing and allocating fish vary by 
state, region, type of fish, and the water resource within which they 
reside.  For comparison purposes, Part II focuses specifically on the 
methods used to address water resource allocation in the Sacramento–
San Joaquin River Delta in California, and Part III looks at fish 
allocation issues in the Pacific Northwest.  Part IV explores property 
 
7. 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 211 (2008). 
8. Zellmer & Harder, supra note 5, at 693 (discussing the Roman, English, and early 
American law recognition of the public trust over water and the universal regard for this 
public resource). 
9. See Josh Eagle, A Window into the Regulated Commons: The Takings Clause, 
Investment Security, and Sustainability, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 654 (2007) (“In order for 
government ownership to succeed, management institutions must take into account the 
incentives of the entrepreneurs embedded within them.”). 
10. See Reza Dibadj, Regulatory Givings and the Anticommons, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1041, 
1110 (2003). 
11. Shelley R. Saxer, The Fluid Nature of Property Rights in Water, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y F. 49, 51 (2010); see also Zellmer & Harder, supra note 5, at 681 (describing how 
interests in water are different in the West and the East in the United States); Dellapenna, 
supra note 3, at 53–55 (same). 
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rights in water and fish, particularly in regard to Fifth Amendment 
takings challenges when government regulations diminish water rights 
and fishing rights.  Takings claims require the existence of a property 
right; and while the water rights claims for a taking have had mixed 
success, the fishing rights claims have been uniformly rejected by courts 
on the basis that these license rights are not considered property.12 
This Article concludes by recognizing that both water and fish 
resources should be managed as ecosystems and governed by the public 
trust doctrine “to manage and protect [these resources] in a sustainable 
fashion . . . for the benefit of current and future generations.”13  
Allowing private property rights in either fish or water may violate the 
public trust doctrine by giving away public resources to private 
interests.14  But, as this Article suggests, the conservation and 
preservation of the right to water (as a public resource) may be 
maintained by viewing water rights as similar to fishing rights. 
II.  ALLOCATING WATER IN CALIFORNIA 
California has a storied history of water rights and the fight for water 
in the arid West.  While the history is fascinating, this Article focuses on 
the Golden State’s equally fascinating current system of surface water 
allocation from the Sacramento–San Joaquin River Delta.  The 
California system of water rights is a hybrid legal regime, meshing 
riparian rights with the prior appropriation doctrine.  Riparian rights are 
based on ownership of land adjacent to the water source and are given 
priority over rights acquired based on first usage under the prior 
appropriation system.15  Appropriative water rights require that a 
 
12. See infra notes 135–39 and accompanying text. 
13. Mary Turnipseed et al., The Silver Anniversary of the United States’ Exclusive 
Economic Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the Possibility of a Blue 
Water Public Trust Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 70 (2009); see also United States v. 
Washington, 573 F.3d 701, 703 (9th Cir. 2009) (“What matters for this case is that the treaties 
also reserved to the tribes the ‘right of taking fish . . . in common with all citizens of the 
United States.’” (quoting Treaty of Point No Point art. IV, Jan. 26, 1855, 12 Stat. 933, 934)); 
Saxer, supra note 11, at 51 (arguing that states should treat water as a public resource by only 
granting usufructuary rights insofar as it does not interfere with the public good). 
14. See Turnipseed et al., supra note 13, at 65–66. 
15. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 732 (Cal. 1886).  This California Supreme Court case is the 
basis for the hybrid California water allocation system.  Currently, when there is a conflict 
between a riparian right, which was first in time as dictated by the title of the land, and an 
appropriation, the riparian right takes precedent.  Id.; see also United States v. Fallbrook Pub. 
Utility Dist., 101 F. Supp. 298, 302–06 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (affirming that Lux still 
applies)Pleasant Valley Canal Co. v. Borror, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 8–9 (Ct. App. 1998) 
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“beneficial use” of the water be made in order to obtain a license from 
the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB).16  While water is 
considered to be the property of the State of California,17 individuals and 
entities can acquire rights to use the water based upon owning riparian 
property18 or putting the water to a beneficial use.19 
The SWRCB has authority to control, appropriate, use, and 
distribute state waters.20  It is the state agency responsible for granting 
water permits to the federal water projects managed by the Bureau of 
Reclamation (BOR) and the state water projects managed by the 
Department of Water Resources (DWR).21  The federal Central Valley 
Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SWP) facilitate the transfer 
of water from northern California to the drier parts of the state.22  These 
projects draw water from the same location at the southern edge of the 
Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta to supply the “end-users in Southern 
California.”23 
The federal BOR and the state DWR manage the CVP and SWP 
projects by contracting with local water agencies to allow the districts 
 
(indicating that Lux is still the general standard in California and the hybrid system remains 
intact).  However, if the appropriation was first in time, then that right has seniority.  Lux, 10 
P. at 733–34. 
16. Gregory E. Good, Administrative Adjudication of Riparian Water Rights in 
California After Imperial Irrigation District v. State Water Resources Control Board, 
19 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 379, 380–82 & n.6 (1989) (quoting CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2). 
17. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1992) (“All water within the State is the property of 
the people of the State, but the right to the use of water may be acquired by appropriation in 
the manner provided by law.”). 
18. Id. § 101. 
19. Id. § 100 (“The right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural 
stream or watercourse in this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably 
required for the beneficial use to be served . . . .”). 
20. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 652–53 & n.7 (1978). 
21. See CAL. WATER CODE § 179 (West 2006) (“The board succeeds to and is vested 
with all of the powers, duties, purposes, responsibilities, and jurisdiction vested in . . . this 
code, or any other law under which permits or licenses to appropriate water are issued, 
denied, or revoked . . . .”). 
22. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314 (2001).  
CVP service areas include Sacramento Valley.  Sacramento Valley Central Valley Project 
Water Service Contracts, N. CAL. WATER ASS’N, http://www.norcalwater.org/water-
rights/sacramento-valley-central-valley-project-water-service-contracts/ (last visited Oct. 10, 
2011).  Further, SWP service areas include northern California regions such as Alameda, 
Butte, Plumas, Solano, Napa, and Santa Clara, as well as Yuba City and the Bay Area. 
California State Water Project Water Contractors, DEP’T WATER RES., 
http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/contractor_intro.cfm (last visited Oct. 5, 2011). 
23. See Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 314–15. 
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the right to withdraw water based on the water permits granted to the 
BOR and DWR by the SWRCB.24  The allotment allowed under these 
county contracts will be impacted by the amount of water available in 
any given year, based upon natural causes.25  While the BOR and DWR 
are responsible for the operating costs of the water system 
infrastructure, regardless of the amount of water granted to them each 
year by the SWRCB, the contracts between DWR and its water 
contractors “explicitly provide that the state will not be held liable for 
shortages due to drought or other causes beyond its control.”26 
At times when the BOR has failed to deliver specified water rights 
based on contracts promising CVP water to California water districts, 
the districts have filed suit against the United States alleging breach of 
contract claims and takings claims.27  The supply of water under these 
CVP contracts has been diminished in some years due to drought and 
the need to keep water at levels sufficient to support fish and wildlife, 
meet water quality standards, and generate hydroelectric power.28  
However, in Stockton East Water District v. United States,29 the Federal 
Circuit found that, even assuming the BOR had acted reasonably in 
allocating water rights,30 the fact that it did not meet its contractual 
obligation to supply specified quantities of water to the districts did not 
relieve it of contractual liability unless it could show that “the shortages 
were the result of causes beyond the control of the United States.”31  
Even if the government avoided liability as a matter of contract law, the 
water districts were allowed to bring takings claims for those years in 
which they did not receive sufficient water under the BOR contracts.32 
The price that water districts pay for water should reflect the 
uncertainty of the resource from year to year, as well as the need to 
support the infrastructure necessary to deliver the water that is available 
for allocation.  However, water districts should not have to pay for water 
they do not receive.  Courts should allow recovery under contract law 
 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. See, e.g., Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
28. Id. at 1363. 
29. Id. at 1344. 
30. Id. at 1365. 
31. Id. at 1369 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
32. Id. 
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for government breaches, but water districts and other water users 
should not be allowed to make takings claims by asserting that water 
usage promised in a contract constitutes a property right, subject to a 
governmental taking.  Water is a common resource belonging to the 
people, and the government should not be required to pay just 
compensation when it diminishes water deliveries based on changing 
hydrology projections from year to year.33 
As water in the West has continued to be a source of conflict 
between a growing population and competing needs, policy makers have 
struggled to incorporate rising environmental concerns into the 
allocation and management of this scarce resource.  The Central Valley 
Project Improvement Act of 1992 (CVPIA)34 demonstrated the federal 
shift in water policy away from the original purposes of supplying 
water—which were consumptive uses such as irrigation, domestic use, 
and industrial processes, in addition to electric energy production and 
navigation improvement35—and instead to the CVPIA’s added purposes 
of fish and wildlife mitigation, protection, and restoration.  The CVPIA 
altered the priority of the purposes by expressly listing these new 
purposes ahead of providing power.36 
In addition to policy changes focusing on environmental protection, 
the CVPIA encourages the use of economic principles to allocate water 
rights.37  CVP contracts can now be renewed for only a twenty-five year 
term instead of a forty-year term, and they may be renewed only after 
an Environmental Impact Statement is completed.38  This Act impacts 
the amount of water that is made available to the BOR for the 
operation of the CVP because it requires the BOR to annually dedicate 
800,000 acre-feet of the CVP yield for fish, wildlife, and habitat 
 
33. See CMIP3, BIAS CORRECTED AND DOWNSCALED WCRP CMIP3 CLIMATE AND 
HYDROLOGY PROJECTIONS, http://gdo-dcp.ucllnl.org/downscaled_cmip3_projections/dcpIn 
terface.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (archive of past years changing hydrology 
projections).  Though there is currently no case that has alleged a taking based on hydrology, 
it is nonetheless an important concept that the government should not be held liable because 
of the fluctuating hydrology predictions. 
34. Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3402, 106 
Stat. 4706, 4706. 
35. Stockton E. Water Dist., 583 F.3d at 1356. 
36. Id. at 1356 (citing Central Valley Project Improvement Act § 3402). 
37. Carl Boronkay & Timothy Quinn, The Central Valley Project Improvement Act: An 
Urban Perspective, 3 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 57, 57–58 (1993) (“The Act . . . 
introduce[d] basic economic reforms to narrow the gap between the cost to the taxpayer of 
supplying CVP water and the prices paid for the water by CVP water users.”). 
38. Id. at 58. 
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restoration.39  The limitations provided in the CVPIA have led to 
conflicts that are best exemplified by the Stockton East Water District 
decision.40 
Finally, the CVPIA promotes the voluntary marketing of CVP water 
in California by allowing water transfers for beneficial uses.41  
Depending upon the circumstances and details of the transaction, these 
transfers may require approval by the SWRCB in order to address 
policy concerns such as unreasonable geographic concentration of 
market activity and unacceptable third-party impacts.42  While water 
marketing may help allocate water to its highest use based upon 
pricing,43 transfers may not occur at an economically optimal level 
because of legal restrictions on such activity.44  It is also not clear 
whether water rights are sufficiently certain to support an effective 
market scheme. 
Assuming water markets can operate successfully, there is still 
concern that the market—and not policy makers—will allocate this 
public resource.45  This concern is illustrated by the situation in Kings 
 
39. Robert Jerome Glennon & John E. Thorson, Federal Environmental Restoration 
Initiatives: An Analysis of Agency Performance and the Capacity for Change, 42 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 483, 515–16 (2000). 
40. See Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344, 1365–68 (Fed. Cir. 
2009).  In Stockton, the Government argued that the 1983 BOR contracts with water districts, 
which specified minimum and maximum water deliveries, rendered performance impossible 
because of the implementation of the 1992 CVPIA and the need to dedicate water to 
environmental uses.  Id. at 1366–67.  The court held that the government had not met its 
burden to show that the implementation of the CVPIA made performance impossible.  Id. at 
1360, 1367–68. 
41. Boronkay & Quinn, supra note 37, at 61 (quoting Central Valley Project 
Improvement Act § 3405(a)). 
42. Id. at 61–62. 
43. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Transferring Water Uses in the West, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 
119, 119 (1990) (noting that water transfers are economically attractive because of the 
“marked disparity in the value of water in many existing uses compared with water’s value in 
alternative uses”). 
44. Id. at 120.  See generally Craig Anthony Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in the 
United States: Human Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 785, 786–89 (2009) (discussing how states’ statutes regulating water 
rights negatively impacted water transfers in those states); Priyanka Sundareshan, Using the 
Transfer of Water Rights as a Climate Change Adaptation Strategy: Comparing the United 
States and Australia, 27 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 911, 930–35 (2010) (arguing that legal 
barriers such as the “artificial legal distinction” between surface water rights and rights to 
groundwater create inefficient outcomes when transferring water rights). 
45. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1810 (West 2006); MacDonnell, supra note 43, at 127–28 
(noting concerns about treating water as a commodity since it is a public resource and the 
community should control water use rather than individual users). 
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County, where farmers were selling their water to a large developer who 
planned to build 23,000 homes in southern California.46  Because 
California now requires developers to show they have a sufficient water 
source before building,47 farmers will sell their annual allotment of water 
to the developers to ensure their ability to meet California’s allotment 
requirement.  Due to the fact that new housing is more valuable than 
the water itself, farmers are then able to receive a price ten times the 
water’s value.48  Such sales were prompted by cutbacks in State Water 
Project deliveries from the Delta, forcing farmers to purchase 
replacement water on the market at prices that increased their irrigation 
costs and created an unacceptable business risk.49  As a result, there may 
be a loss of agricultural production, which could potentially devastate 
the economy in some California communities that rely on agriculture for 
jobs, taxes, and general economic health.50 
Balancing the allocation of water, particularly in times of scarcity, 
has continued to pit urban users, farmers, and fishers against each 
other.51  The major problem is that while there is sufficient water in 
northern California, the central and southern parts of the state need to 
transfer water from the Sacramento–San Joaquin River Delta to supply 
farmers in the Central Valley and urban users in southern California.52  
The storage and transfer of water from the north is accomplished by 
 
46. Mark Grossi, Kings County Farmers Land Lucrative Water Sales, REVIVE THE SAN 
JOAQUIN (Nov. 21, 2010), http://www.revivethesanjoaquin.org/content/kings-county-farmers-
land-lucrative-water-sales. 
47. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66473.7(b)(1) (West 2009); CAL. WATER CODE 
§§ 10910, 10912 (West 1992); see also Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. 
City of Rancho Cordova, 150 P.3d 709, 718 (Cal. 2007) (discussing the level of certainty 
regarding the sufficiency of water supply required for a new development). 
48. Grossi, supra note 46. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Jody Only, Delta Debate Decision for Water Rights Farmers vs. Fishermen: Federal 
Judge Orders Tracy Pumps On, EXAMINER.COM (May 26, 2010), http://www.examiner. 
com/fishing-in-stockton/delta-debate-decision-for-water-rights-farmers-vs-fishermen-federal-
judge-orders-tracy-pumps-on.  It is not necessarily clear, though, why some agricultural users 
are transferring their water supply.  As suggested above, it may be because frequent supply 
cutbacks render farming less feasible, or that the amount of money urban areas can pay for 
the water far exceeds the net income that the farmers make through agriculture.  In either 
case, the result—a strong desire to transfer water—nevertheless has the potential to devastate 
communities. 
52. CONG. BUDGET OFF., U.S. CONG., WATER USE CONFLICTS IN THE WEST: 
IMPLICATIONS OF REFORMING THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION’S WATER SUPPLY 
POLICIES 27 (1997). 
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managing a system of dams, canals, tunnels, and power plants which 
must be paid for by the water users, regardless of how much water is 
delivered from the state and federal water projects.53  The powerful 
water pumps that deliver this Delta water from the Sacramento, San 
Joaquin, and American rivers in the north to the Bay Area, the central 
coast, and approximately two-thirds of southern California, trap and 
interfere with salmon, steelhead, and sturgeon populations and impact 
the southern-resident whales that feed on the salmon.54 
Beginning in 2005, the interests of the urban user, the farmer, and 
the fish collided in newsworthy litigation when a group of sport-fishing 
and environmental organizations challenged a finding by the United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) that the Delta smelt was not 
jeopardized by the impacts of the Delta’s federal and state water 
diversion programs.55  The court in Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
Kempthorne held that the biological opinion prepared by the FWS was 
inadequate,56 in part because the opinion did not take into account the 
issue of climate change.57  The judge deciding the Kempthorne case, 
Judge Oliver Wanger, also held in a related case, Pacific Coast 
Federation of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez,58 that the biological 
opinion prepared by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in 
2004 for various salmonid species was flawed.59  Among other 
inadequacies, both biological opinions failed to take into account the 
effects of global climate change on the Delta’s hydrology when 
determining whether the Delta water projects jeopardized these 
threatened and endangered species and their habitats under the 
Endangered Species Act.60 
By the end of 2007, Judge Wanger began issuing orders restricting 
the operations for the Delta pumps and reducing and halting water 
exports in order to protect the affected fish species.61  These restrictions 
 
53. Grossi, supra note 46. 
54. See Only, supra note 51. 
55. Carolyn Brickey et al., How to Take Climate Change Into Account: A Guidance 
Document for Judges Adjudicating Water Disputes, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11215, 11217 (2010). 
56. 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 387–88 (E.D. Cal. 2007). 
57. Id. 
58. 606 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 
59. Id. at 1193; see also Brickey et al., supra note 55, at 11217 (discussing same and 
comparing Gutierrez to Kempthorne). 
60. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1183–84. 
61. Interim Remedial Order Following Summary Judgment and Evidentiary Hearing at 
2–3, Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2007) 
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caused an uproar.  Water shortages and economic woes generated cries 
for “people above fish” after the drought, which had resulted in fallow 
farmland, unemployment, and economic decline in the Central Valley.62  
However, in May 2010, Judge Wanger reviewed the revised biological 
opinion for salmonid and found that water officials acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously, and that “consulting and action agencies . . . must take the 
hard look under [the National Environmental Policy Act] at the 
draconian consequences visited upon [the p]laintiffs, the water supply of 
California, the agricultural industry, and the residents and communities 
devastated by the water supply limitations imposed . . . .”63  Judge 
Wanger similarly found that the Delta smelt biological opinion was 
arbitrary and capricious and failed to take into account the impact on 
humans when considering water cutbacks to urban and agricultural 
users.64 
Final judgment on the remaining Delta smelt claims was issued on 
March 29, 2011, and the court ordered the FWS to complete a new 
Delta smelt biological opinion by October 1, 2011.65  In May 2011, Judge 
Wanger agreed to amend the judgment to adjust the remand schedule 
such that a final biological opinion and other required analyses be 
completed by December 1, 2013, instead of the initial October 1, 2011 
deadline.66 
Now that California’s most recent three-year drought has finally 
ended,67 the current controversy may also be coming to an end.  Indeed, 
the federal government and water contractors agreed, in February 2011, 
to relax restrictions on pumping operations until the end of June 2011, 
while federal agencies continue to monitor Delta conditions to 
determine whether pumping must be limited.68 
The Delta litigation illustrates the dynamic nature of water 
 
(No. 1:05-cv-01207). 
62. 155 CONG. REC. H5099, 5103–04 (daily ed. May 5, 2009) (remarks of Rep. Calvert). 
63. Consol. Salmonid Cases, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1171 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
64. Consol. Delta Smelt Cases, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1069–71 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
65. Delta Smelt Consol. Cases, No. 1:09-CV-00407, 2011 WL 1740308, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 
May 4, 2011). 
66. Id. at *8. 
67. See Zeke Barlow, California’s Drought is Officially Over, VENTURA CNTY. STAR 
(Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.vcstar.com/news/2011/mar/30/californias-drought-is-officially-
over/. 
68. See Bettina Boxall, Temporary Truce Reached in California Delta Smelt Water 
Restrictions, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/25/local/la-me-
smelt-20110225. 
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allocation in an environment faced with many challenges, including 
changing climate, drought conditions, increasing demand for water 
resources, and uncertainty regarding the impact of water limitations on 
fish, habitats, crops, power generation, and humans.  While assigning 
private property rights has the potential to prevent a tragedy of the 
commons and to promote the efficient use of a limited resource, it is 
difficult in this dynamic system to provide certainty of the extent and 
consistency of such rights.  In addition, any establishment of a market in 
natural resources will require an initial allocation of rights.  This 
allocation may be based on previous usage and priorities established as 
part of our water law regimes, but such an arrangement may not be fair 
because “[t]hose who are initially able to obtain the largest water rights 
reap the benefits of future trades to more beneficial uses.”69 
Identifying water usage rights as property is problematic because the 
rights initially belong to the state, and the state should be able to restrict 
water usage without being required to pay a permit holder for the right 
to retain the water instream.  Finally, the public nature of this resource 
is such that policy makers, rather than the private marketplace, should 
determine the appropriate allocation of water on a continuing basis in 
order to properly support agricultural economies and designate land use 
for growing populations with water needs. 
III.  ALLOCATING FISH IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 
The nation’s fishery resources are managed under the auspices of the 
Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
(Magnuson–Stevens Act), which was enacted in 1975 “to protect United 
States fisheries by extending the exclusive fisheries zone of the United 
States from 12 to 200 miles and to provide for management of fishing 
within the 200-mile zone.”70  Under the Magnuson–Stevens Act, 
Regional Fishery Management Councils (RFMCs) are required to 
“prepare[] and submit[] to the Secretary of Commerce a fishery 
management plan (FMP) with respect to each fishery within its 
 
69. See Nicole L. Johnson, Property Without Possession, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 205, 229–
30 (2007) (noting that an “arbitrary initial allocation” of water can lead to inefficiencies over 
time and creates distributive justice concerns). 
70. Wash. State Charterboat Ass’n v. Baldrige, 702 F.2d 820, 823–24 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-445, at 21 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 593, at 593–94).  
However, it could be argued that the controversy only temporarily took a rest due to a wet 
year, and that new litigation will take place once new biological opinions are issued. 
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geographical area of authority.”71  Fish allocation based on these FMPs 
is subject to regulation under the Magnuson–Stevens Act, but must also 
take into account other applicable law, including Indian treaty fishing 
rights.72  The United States Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), in 
conjunction with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), manages 
fishery resources subject to the Magnuson–Stevens Act.73  For the 
Pacific Northwest region, the Magnuson–Stevens Act empowers the 
Pacific Coast Fishery Management Council (PFMC), as one of the 
RFMCs, to make recommendations to the Secretary for FMPs covering 
fisheries along the United States’ western territorial waters.74 
The Magnuson–Stevens Act requires that FMPs contain 
conservation and management measures, which are consistent with ten 
national standards as stated in 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)–(10): 
 
(1) Conservation and management measures shall prevent 
overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum 
yield75 from each fishery for the United States fishing industry. 
(2) Conservation and management measures shall be 
based upon the best scientific information available. 
(3) To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish 
shall be managed as a unit throughout its range, and interrelated 
stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination. 
(4) Conservation and management measures shall not 
discriminate between residents of different States.  If it becomes 
necessary to allocate or assign fishing privileges among various 
United States fishermen, such allocation shall be (A) fair and 
equitable to all such fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to 
promote conservation; and (C) carried out in such manner that 
no particular individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an 
excessive share of such privileges. 
(5) Conservation and management measures shall, where 
 
71. Midwater Trawlers Coop. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 393 F.3d 994, 998 n.6 (9th Cir. 
2004) (citations omitted) (quoting Washington v. Daley, 173 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
72. Midwater Trawlers, 393 F.3d at 998. 
73. United States v. Washington, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1220 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
74. Id. 
75. Optimum yield is defined, in part, as the amount of fish which “will provide the 
greatest overall benefit to the Nation, particularly with respect to food production and 
recreational opportunities, and taking into account the protection of marine ecosystems . . . .”  
16 U.S.C. § 1802(28)(A) (2006). 
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practicable, consider efficiency in the utilization of fishery 
resources; except that no such measure shall have economic 
allocation as its sole purpose. 
(6) Conservation and management measures shall take 
into account and allow for variations among, and contingencies 
in, fisheries, fishery resources, and catches. 
(7) Conservation and management measures shall, where 
practicable, minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication. 
(8) Conservation and management measures shall, 
consistent with the conservation requirements of this chapter 
(including the prevention of overfishing and rebuilding of 
overfished stocks), take into account the importance of fishery 
resources to fishing communities by utilizing economic and 
social data that meet the requirements of paragraph (2), in order 
to (A) provide for the sustained participation of such 
communities, and (B) to the extent practicable, minimize 
adverse economic impacts on such communities. 
(9) Conservation and management measures shall, to the 
extent practicable, (A) minimize bycatch and (B) to the extent 
bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the mortality of such 
bycatch. 
(10) Conservation and management measures shall, to the 
extent practicable, promote the safety of human life at sea.76 
 
In addition to the above-required national standards, “[t]he Magnuson–
Stevens Act provides discretionary authority for the NMFS . . . to 
‘establish a limited access system for the fishery in order to achieve 
optimum yield,’” by taking into account considerations such as 
 
(A) present participation in the fishery; 
(B) historical fishing practices in, and dependence on, the 
fishery; 
(C) the economics of the fishery; 
(D) the capability of fishing vessels used in the fishery to 
engage in other fisheries; 
(E) the cultural and social framework relevant to the 
fishery and any affected fishing communities; 
(F) the fair and equitable distribution of access privileges 
in the fishery; and 
 
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)–(10) (2006). 
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(G) any other relevant considerations.77 
 
The United States Pacific Northwest region provides a good 
illustration of how state and federal fishing rights are allocated by 
federal and state authorities among competing uses in both interior 
water bodies and the ocean.  Environmental, economic, and tribal 
interests must be weighed in analyzing the right to capture these 
important resources and must be distributed based upon year-to-year 
projections of fish availability.78  For example, as noted above in 
Standard Two, the Magnuson–Stevens Act requires that fish allocation 
be based on the “best scientific information available” for purposes of 
conservation and management of fisheries.79 
The federal government maintains jurisdiction over fishery 
resources, but under the Magnuson–Stevens Act, states retain 
jurisdiction over resources within state territories.80  A state also has 
jurisdiction over fishing vessels registered under the law of that state 
when operating outside state territories, so long as such vessels are not 
subject to federal fishing regulations.81  In any case, the state’s laws must 
be consistent with the FMP or applicable federal fishing regulations.82  
Individual states cannot enforce regulations against vessels registered 
under the law of other states when those vessels are operating in the 
federal exclusive economic zone (EEZ) adjacent to state territorial 
waters and submerged land that extends three miles from the state 
coastline.83 
The prohibition against regulating other states’ vessels can be 
modified by legislation when necessary to promote management of 
 
77. Gen. Category Scallop Fishermen v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 720 F. Supp. 
2d 564, 575 (D.N.J. 2010) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(6) (2006)). 
78. See, e.g., Midwater Trawlers Coop. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 393 F.3d 994, 1003 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (discussing the Act’s requirement that “allocations between treaty and nontreaty 
fishers be based on the ‘best scientific information available’” (citing and quoting 16 U.S.C § 
1851(a)(2))); Midwater Trawlers Coop. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 282 F.3d 710, 719 (9th Cir. 
2002) (“[T]he Makah Tribe is entitled, pursuant to the Treaty of Neah Bay, to one-half the 
harvestable surplus of Pacific whiting that passes through its usual and accustomed fishing 
grounds, or that much of the harvestable surplus as is necessary for tribal subsistence, 
whichever is less.”). 
79. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2). 
80. Marble v. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 234 P.3d 1062, 1069 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (citing 
16 U.S.C. § 1856 (2006)). 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 1063 n.2, 1070. 
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limited regional resources, as was done in the Dungeness Crab Act in 
1996.  The Dungeness Crab Act authorized Oregon, Washington, and 
California “to enforce certain [s]tate regulations against all vessels 
operating in the exclusive economic zone and fishing for Dungeness 
crab,”84 so long as the state did not discriminate “against a vessel that 
presently ‘is operating’ in its adjacent EEZ under the authority of an 
out-of-state permit.”85  As a result, the court in Marble v. Department of 
Fish and Wildlife86 held that Oregon did not discriminate against a vessel 
presently holding an Oregon crab permit when Oregon considered past 
crab landings to determine the allocation of crab-pot limits by the vessel, 
but did not include landings for vessels registered under another state 
during the qualifying period for the allocation determination.87 
Allocation decisions may be challenged under federal regulations 
and various treaties.  In Midwater Trawlers Co-Operative v. Department 
of Commerce, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a challenged allocation of 
Pacific whiting fish between treaty and non-treaty fishers.88  The 
challenged allocation was based on a sliding scale method instead of a 
biomass method.89  The court concluded that even though the Fisheries 
Service’s use of the sliding scale method may have been initially based 
on a political compromise with the Makah Tribe, this method was 
supported by the best available scientific information because it 
accounted for the fish’s migratory pattern—something not accomplished 
using the biomass method.90  The allocation was required because the 
“Makah possesses an undisturbed right to take fish at its usual and 
accustomed fishing grounds pursuant to the Stevens Treaties, which 
have been interpreted to reserve for Indian tribes the right to up to half 
of the harvestable surplus whiting, while reserving the other half for 
non-treaty fishers . . . .”91 
 
84. Id. at 1070 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-297, § 112(d) (1996), repealed by Pub. L. No. 105-
674, § 2 (g) (1998)). 
85. Id. at 1072. 
86. Id. at 1064. 
87. Id. at 1064, 1072. 
88. 393 F.3d 994, 997–1002 (9th Cir. 2004). 
89. Id. at 1003. 
90. Id. at 1003–04 (noting that the biomass approach underestimated the number of fish 
passing through the tribe’s fishing grounds). 
91. See United States v. Washington, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1220–21 (W.D. Wash. 2001) 
(“[H]arvestable surplus of whiting is defined as the total number of fish that may be taken 
while observing all conservation needs that prevent demonstrable harm to the stock, and 
treaty harvest is limited only by this conservation principle.”). 
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States in the Pacific Northwest are also responsible for managing 
fisheries and fishing vessels within their jurisdictions.  Over the years, 
the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW) developed 
rules for salmon fishing in the Puget Sound.  These rules were created 
by forecasting the number of salmon expected to return for the season, 
allocating the forecasted number between treaty and non-treaty 
fishermen, and then holding public meetings to obtain agreement 
between the gear groups of gillnetters and purse seiners.92  In 2008, when 
the WDFW was unable to obtain agreement between gillnetters and 
purse seiners, it adopted a rule allocating fishing opportunity based on 
the number of fishing days, rather than capping the total catch for each 
group.93  A trial court held this rule to be arbitrary and capricious.94 
The court in Puget Sound Harvesters Ass’n v. Washington State 
Department of Fish & Wildlife95 upheld the trial court’s invalidation of 
this rule as arbitrary and capricious because it did not take into account 
“both time on the water and gear efficiency to estimate relative shares 
of the fish harvest,” even though it had historical catch rates from 
previous seasons, which reflected higher catch rates for gillnet gear.96  
The court observed that the development of these rules should reflect 
the defined management objectives for the fisheries: 
 
(1)  Ensure the conservation of target species—meet 
spawning goals; 
(2)  Minimize catch or impacts on incidental species 
(bycatch); 
(3)  Monitor and sample all fisheries; 
(4)  Maintain the economic well-being and stability of the 
fishing industry; 
(5)  Fully utilize the non-Indian allowable catch; and, 
(6)  Fairly allocate harvest opportunity between gear 
groups.97 
 
Thus, both federal and state laws utilize allocation rules to ensure 
 
92. Puget Sound Harvesters Ass’n v. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 239 P.3d 1140, 1141–42 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2010). 
93. Id. at 1142. 
94. Id. at 1144. 
95. Id. at 1140. 
96. Id. at 1147–48. 
97. Id. at 1146 (discussing objectives for Puget Sound commercial salmon fisheries). 
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conservation of fish species for the benefit of the fishing industry and 
other interest groups.  International laws are beyond the scope of this 
Article, although fish and water resources are certainly impacted by the 
actions of other nations and their citizens.  The state and federal 
allocation of fishing rights does not require that these rights be 
recognized as property rights.  As discussed in Part IV, infra, fishing 
rights are not considered property in challenges to government 
regulation based on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  
Similarly, water rights should not be considered property subject to a 
takings challenge and should, instead, be treated as revocable licenses. 
IV.  PROPERTY RIGHTS IN UNCAPTURED FISH AND WATER 
A.  Ecosystem Challenges 
The allocation systems for water and fish must deal with the 
ecosystem challenges associated with fragile and interconnected 
resources.  Both water and fish allocation systems have been criticized 
for their failure to take into account ecosystem management.98  Instead 
of taking on the ecosystem as a whole, fishing regulations have focused 
on specific species,99 whereas prior appropriation and riparian rights 
 
98. See, e.g., Donna R. Christie, Living Marine Resources Management: A Proposal for 
Integration of United States Management Regimes, 34 ENVTL. L. 107, 114, 153 (2004) (noting 
the 1996 reauthorization of the Magnuson–Stevens Act, its major changes, and the remaining 
criticisms); Sarah M. Kutil, Comment, Scientific Certainty Thresholds in Fisheries 
Management: A Response to a Changing Climate, 41 ENVTL. L. 233, 239 (2011) (noting that 
even though the Magnuson–Stevens Act was amended in 2006 to increase its focus on 
conservation, the Act is flawed because it does not “provide a framework for or require a 
scientific certainty threshold . . . to manage fisheries”); cf. Brickey et al., supra note 55, at 
11221, 11226–27 (discussing water management concerns, including the conjunctive 
management of surface and groundwater, the negative externalities from conservation, the 
need for integrated land use planning with water supply availability, and the need for a 
flexible water rights approach to manage large fluctuations in water supply).  However, unlike 
fish populations, which are organic resources subject to extinction if their levels drop too low, 
fresh water is not in danger of extinction (though it may potentially cause extinction of 
organic resources if it is in short supply and unable to support aquatic ecosystems). 
99. Turnipseed et al., supra note 13, at 6 (observing that “unsustainable fishing practices 
have been responsible for some of the most harmful effects on ocean ecosystems” and 
explaining that management by species can result in a high discard rate with three fish thrown 
back for every ten fish captured); see also Christie, supra note 98, at 135 (explaining that 
fisheries management in the United States historically focused on a single species and that 
“this species-by-species approach has contributed to a seeming ‘domino effect’ in the collapse 
of fisheries”); Robin Kundis Craig, Protecting International Marine Biodiversity: International 
Treaties and National Systems of Marine Protected Areas, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 333, 
359 (2005) (“[O]ne of the most important limitations of regulation directed specifically at 
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have focused on water resources in specific water bodies.100  Yet, it is 
only through an emphasis on ecosystem management that we can 
effectively protect and manage our fish and water resources.101 
In addition, by applying the public trust doctrine to federal ocean 
management, the government will be required to protect ecosystems as 
it acts as a trustee to protect the public uses of these valuable trust 
resources.102  Economic-based market systems may be used to protect 
ecosystems from overexploitation by commodities users such as 
commercial fisherman and water consumers, but only if these 
ecosystems can be valued for the additional amenities they provide, such 
as recreation and tourism.103 
Like fish, the available water supply is dependent upon natural 
conditions, which may vary drastically from season to season and year to 
year and are currently out of direct human control.  Both of these 
resources are intricately connected to fragile ecosystems, which can be 
permanently damaged by overexploitation.  As common resources, both 
water and fish are subject to a tragedy of the commons scenario, which 
may be partially resolved by private ownership.104 
Our current model for fishing management has its limitations, but 
the underlying theories of natural resource economics are applicable to 
our water management challenges.  The United States has attempted to 
control overfishing and overinvestment in the fishing industry by having 
government agencies set annual allocations (quotas) based upon 
 
fishing is that such regulation tends to focus exclusively on the targeted species, without 
consideration of the larger ecosystem on which it depends.”). 
100. See Dellapenna, supra note 3, at 55, 64–65. 
101. Christie, supra note 98, at 168 (“Both exploited and protected species should be 
managed through a comprehensive system that takes an ecosystem-based approach to 
decisions concerning the level of removal allowed for species.”); Craig, supra note 99, at 369 
(“Only an international law regime that addresses all of those threats [to marine 
biodiversity]—pollution, overfishing and its associated problems, loss of habitat, and invasive 
species—both individually and collectively can effectively halt, and hopefully reverse, the 
increasing trend of marine species extinctions and loss of marine biodiversity at all levels.”); 
see also THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE 14 (2010) (describing how it is time for the 
Nation to focus on ecosystem management to effectively use and protect environmental 
resources). 
102. Turnipseed et al., supra note 13, at 68. 
103. Robin Kundis Craig, Valuing Coastal and Ocean Ecosystem Services: The Paradox 
of Scarcity for Marine Resources Commodities and the Potential Role of Lifestyle Value 
Competition, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 355, 362–63 (2007). 
104. See Eagle, supra note 9, at 623. 
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scientific advice regarding available catch levels.105  This model of sole 
government ownership is an economic approach based on the theory 
that such ownership “rationalizes resource use by eliminating wasteful 
competition for the resource among fishermen and by internalizing 
individually generated externalities.”106  However, as a “private” owner, 
the government must regulate to limit resource usage, and also facilitate 
the investment by fishermen to extract the resource.107 
Some systems of allocating water rights and fishing rights have been 
based upon prior usage.  Such a prior use requirement for allocation of 
rights may create an incentive to “race to capture” either water or fish 
to establish a historical usage basis by which future allocations will be 
determined.108  For fish, the allocation of individual fishing quotas (IFQ) 
is used to limit the taking of fish to preserve fish stocks.109  Because these 
quotas are typically issued based upon a prior fishing history,110 
regulators may attempt to avoid a race to capture by limiting the 
qualifying period to preceding years well in advance of the regulation 
implementation.  This approach helps diminish “the incentive [for 
fishermen] to pour money and time into the fishery in order to get a 
bigger quota share . . . .”111 
For water, similar race to capture concerns exist, particularly in 
those states using prior appropriation to determine water rights.  In a 
particularly famous illustration of this problem, William Mulholland 
 
105. Id. at 644–46 (discussing the Magnuson–Stevens Act and the efforts of the Gulf of 
Mexico Fishery Management Council). 
106. Id. at 643 (noting, however, that there is a distinction between public and private 
ownership in that the government is not profit oriented like a private owner is). 
107. See id. at 623–24. 
108. Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to 
Environmental Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 811 (2009).  As Remy explains, 
 
 To prevent the creation of an incentive for actors to increase their current 
activities in order to receive a larger allocation of resource access in the future, the 
government may choose to base allocations not on current activities, but on recent 
activities that predate the announced intention to implement limitations on 
resource access. 
Id. 
109. Id. at 819. 
110. See, e.g., Van Valin v. Locke, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2009) (“While present 
participation in the fishery is one factor that the Secretary must examine when considering 
fishery management measures, another factor is historic harvest participation levels.”). 
111. Nash, supra note 108, at 826 (quoting Alliance Against IFQS v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343, 
348 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
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appropriated the Owens Valley water for Los Angeles.  In 1906, Senator 
Frank Flint of California introduced a bill to obtain rights-of-way across 
federal land for Los Angeles to proceed with the water transport from 
the Owens Valley.112  Although the bill easily won Senate approval, 
Congressman Sylvester Smith, a member of the House Public Lands 
Committee, stalled the bill and proposed that the project could move 
forward so long as “the Owens Valley would have a nonnegotiable first 
right to the water, and any surplus water could not be used for irrigation 
in the San Fernando Valley.”113  Senator Flint then made an impassioned 
appeal to President Roosevelt: 
 
Smith’s prohibition on using surplus water in the San Fernando 
Valley left the city no choice but to leave any surplus in the 
Owens Valley or dump it in the ocean.  In the first case, water 
rights the city had purchased at great expense might revert to 
the valley under the doctrine of appropriative rights; in the 
second case, the city would violate the California constitution, 
which forbade “inefficient use” of water.114 
 
Roosevelt agreed with Flint and wrote, “‘[T]his water is more 
valuable to the people of Los Angeles than to the Owens Valley.’”115  
Los Angeles proceeded with Mulholland’s plan to store unused water in 
a natural underground storage reservoir in the San Fernando Valley and 
turn the Valley’s arid land into valuable agricultural plots.116  
Mulholland’s plan to divert as much water as possible for Los Angeles 
was designed to avoid “the use-it-or-lose-it principle in the doctrine of 
appropriative rights.”117 
Fishing allocations under a FMP are valuable rights, but they have 
not traditionally been viewed as property rights belonging to fishers.118  
Instead, property rights in this resource arose only when the fish were 
 
112. MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS 
DISAPPEARING WATER 79 (1993). 
113. Id. at 79–80. 
114. Id. at 81–82. 
115. Id. at 82. 
116. Id. at 73–74. 
117. Id. at 73.  What is also interesting is that the key public trust case in California, 
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), resulted 
from Mulholland’s effort to bring water from the Eastern Sierra to Southern California. 
118. Nash, supra note 108, at 819. 
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captured within the limits of fishing permits.119  The concept of the IFQ, 
discussed above, created a category of “property rights in the form of 
issuing licenses to fish for a specified quantity of the species in 
question.”120  These rights were transferable by private sale and created 
a private market, supported by the concept of limiting access to fishery 
resources.121  By restricting entry to the commons through the 
establishment of property rights in the fish stocks, economists hoped to 
solve the potential collapse of our fish resources.122  However, the 
Magnuson–Stevens Act limits these IFQ rights by notifying permit 
holders that these licenses are revocable at any time without 
compensation because the license “‘shall not create, or be construed to 
create, any right, title, or interest in or to any fish before the fish is 
harvested.’”123  Thus, the advantage of using private property rights to 
incentivize efficiency is “somewhat undercut by the temporary nature of 
the created property interest.”124  Nevertheless, “fishers usually do not 
have property rights in wild fish before they are harvested from the 
sea.”125 
In contrast, water rights have more frequently been viewed as 
property rights protected not only by priority in relation to others based 
on first-in-time, first-in-right ownership, but also against excessive 
government restriction of these rights under Fifth Amendment Takings 
law.126  Although water rights have been referred to as property rights, 
such rights are “not to the water itself but to the priority to the use of 
water from a particular source.”127  Thus, water rights may have value 
 
119. See id. 
120. Harry N. Scheiber & Christopher J. Carr, From Extended Jurisdiction to 
Privatization: International Law, Biology, and Economics in the Marine Fisheries Debates, 
1937–1976, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 10, 16 (1998). 
121. Id. at 16, 54. 
122. Will Walsh, Comment, Fishy Business, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1661, 1662–63 (2008). 
123. Id. at 1674 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1853(d)(3)(D) (2000)). 
124. Id. at 1676; see also Katrina M. Wyman, The Property Rights Challenge in Marine 
Fisheries, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 514 (2008) (advocating a broader view of property rights in 
fisheries to take into account both aquaculture and wild fisheries). 
125. See Wyman, supra note 124, at 527. 
126. Richard A. Epstein, Playing by Different Rules? Property Rights in Land and Water 
3 (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Res. Paper Ser., Working Paper No. 10-56, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1719688##. 
127. MacDonnell, supra note 43, at 121.  Thus, what is ultimately at issue is the right to 
use.  What complicates this matter even more are the cases that have dealt with contract 
rights to water, rather than appropriative or riparian rights.  See Kern Cnty. Water Agency v. 
Belridge Water Storage Dist., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 354, 360 (Ct. App. 1993); Empire W. Side 
 
SAXER-13.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  9:55 AM 
2011] MANAGING WATER RIGHTS 113 
between private persons, but they should be subject to revocation by the 
government acting for the public trust, without payment of just 
compensation.128  Establishing certainty by recognizing property rights in 
water may help improve market efficiency, but the water supply is as 
uncertain as the yearly harvest opportunity for fish and these two 
resources may not be amenable to privatization in the way that real 
property has been successfully privatized to avoid a tragedy of the 
commons.129 
B.  The Takings Clause 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states the following: 
“nor shall private property be taken for a public use without just 
compensation.”130  The United States Supreme Court in Armstrong v. 
United States131 recognized that this guarantee “was designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”132  If we have been receiving water and we get less than we 
need—perhaps because the government has determined that the water 
is needed for the fish—should the government pay us just compensation 
because it has taken away a property right?  If fish die or diminish in 
number because there is not enough water to support them or our needs 
have reduced their numbers, do the fishermen deserve just 
compensation because the government has allowed their fishing rights 
to dissipate due to overexploitation?133 
 
Irrigation Dist. v. Lovelace, 85 Cal. Rptr. 552, 555 (Ct. App. 1970).  Then, to further cloud the 
issues, there is also a line of cases that have ruled on the issue of taking groundwater rights.  
See Orange Cnty. Water Dist. v. Arnold Eng’g Co., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 328, 339 (Ct. App. 
2011); Starrh & Starrh Cotton Growers v. Aera Energy, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 182–83 (Ct. 
App. 2007) (analogizing that groundwater rights are akin to real property rights). 
128. George J. Mannina Jr., Is There a Legal and Conservation Basis for Individual 
Fishing Quotas?, 3 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 5, 49–50 (1997) (citing Acton v. United States, 
401 F.2d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 1968)). 
129. See Epstein, supra note 126, at 59–60. 
130. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
131. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
132. Id. at 49. 
133. The issue, then, is whether fishermen can state a takings cause of action if they can 
show that water authorization reduced their take of fish.  It might be difficult, because there is 
generally no property right to wild animals until they are reduced to possession under the 
right of capture.  Patrick Stoklas, Comment, Popov v. Hayashi, A Modern Day Pierson v. 
Post: A Comment on What the Court Should Have Done With the Seventy-Third Home Run 
Baseball Hit by Barry Bonds, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 901, 910 (2003).  In essence, the “right to 
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When water rights are restricted in order to serve public needs, such 
as with the protection of endangered species or habitat preservation, 
such regulations have been subject to takings claims to prevent 
individual farmers or other entities from bearing a public burden.134  In 
contrast, courts in fishing cases have recognized that the Secretary of 
Commerce is allowed to allocate fish even where “the interests of some 
groups of fishermen [are sacrificed] for the benefit as the Secretary sees 
it of the fishery as a whole.”135  Both fishermen and farmers have 
investments that are affected by reductions in supply.  Fishermen have 
invested in boats, nets, and other fishing gear, while farmers have 
invested in farm equipment and farmland.  However, the supplies of 
both fish and water are dynamic and the government should be allowed 
to allocate these natural resources for the public good without exposure 
to takings claims. 
The first requirement of a takings claim is the existence of a private 
property right that is compensable under the Fifth Amendment.136  
While takings claims involving water rights have had mixed success 
because of the uncertain nature of these rights as property,137 takings 
claims involving fishing rights have been uniformly dismissed because 
“[h]olders of fishing permits issued pursuant to the Magnuson–Stevens 
Act do not possess a valid property interest in such permits.”138  Water 
rights are similar to fishing rights and grazing rights and, as such, should 
not be treated as property.  Instead, these rights should be treated as 
 
fish” is the right to have an opportunity to fish, but if no fish are caught, then there can be no 
taking under traditional property principles. 
134. See infra text accompanying notes 138–70.  But see MacDonnell, supra note 43, at 
123 (“In California, the public trust doctrine has been found to require a reconsideration of 
the amount of water that may be used under an existing water right.”). 
135. Fishermen’s Finest, Inc. v. Locke, 593 F.3d 886, 899 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343, 350 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also N.C. Fisheries 
Ass’n v. Gutierrez, 518 F. Supp. 2d 62, 89 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[C]ourts have declined to second-
guess the Secretary’s judgment simply because the provisions of a [Fishery Management Plan] 
or a plan allocation ‘have a greater impact upon’ one group or type of fishermen.” (quoting 
Nat’l Fisheries Inst., Inc. v. Mosbacher, 732 F. Supp. 210, 225 (D.D.C. 1990))). 
136. See Sacramento Grazing Ass’n v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 175, 189 (2010) (citing 
Sacramento Grazing Ass’n v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 211, 216–17 (2005)) (“[T]aking cannot 
exist without an underlying compensable property right.”). 
137. See Saxer, supra note 11, at 51–53; John D. Leshy, A Conversation About Takings 
and Water Rights, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1985, 2006 (2005) (“[C]hronic uncertainty about the 
validity and measure of many water rights has some important implications for takings law.”). 
138. Gen. Category Scallop Fishermen v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 720 F. Supp. 
2d 564, 576 (D.N.J. 2010) (citing Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
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licenses that are revocable by the government without requiring just 
compensation.139 
State and federal courts have varied views on whether property 
rights in water exist.140  Some courts have treated water rights as 
property and conducted a takings analysis,141 while others have found 
that no property rights in water exist and have dismissed the claim 
because the first requirement for a takings challenge has not been met.142  
One court stressed the difference between land ownership rights and 
usufructuary rights in water, but then continued in that same decision to 
find a taking of water rights.143 
Early court decisions recognized property rights in water sufficient 
for a takings claim.144  In Dugan v. Rank,145 for example, the United 
States Supreme Court concluded that the United States government 
committed a partial taking of water by operating a dam that would have 
reduced the natural amount of water flowing in the San Joaquin River 
by almost three-fourths.146  Recent decisions have also recognized 
property rights in water.  In Hage v. United States (Hage IV),147 the 
 
139. Recall that under California case law, water right permits are under the jurisdiction 
of the SWRCB and are subject to modification for public interest and public trust purposes.  
United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 185-87 (Ct. App. 1986).  It 
follows that post-1914 appropriative water right holders were on notice at the time they filed 
their application that what they were obtaining was a license, and it was subject to 
modification.  See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text. 
140. See supra Part II. 
141. See, e.g., Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
142. See, e.g., Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 532 (2005) 
(characterizing the claimant’s right as a contract right rather than a property right); Mono 
Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 723 (Cal. 1983) (rejecting the notion that the public trust approach to 
water constitutes a taking). 
143. See Hage V, 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 211 (2008) (noting the difference between water 
ownership as the right to access and use water versus land ownership as the right to exclude, 
and then finding a taking based on the government fencing around the water and streams). 
144. See, e.g., Rivers and Harbors Act § 2, Pub. L. No. 75-392, 50 Stat. 844, 850 (1937) 
(“[T]he Secretary of the Interior . . . may acquire by proceedings in eminent domain, or 
otherwise, all lands, rights-of-way, water rights, and other property necessary for said 
purposes . . . .”); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 296–97 (1958) 
(recognizing a property right but finding no taking); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 
339 U.S. 725, 752–55 (1950) (finding the riparian owner held rights which could only be 
acquired by the government through condemnation or acquisition); Int’l Paper Co. v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 399, 405–07 (1931) (finding a taking of the plaintiff’s water rights). 
145. 372 U.S. 609 (1963). 
146. Id. at 623. 
147. 51 Fed. Cl. 570 (2002). 
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Court of Federal Claims acknowledged that “[t]he surface waters which 
flow from federal land to Plaintiffs’ patented lands are a vested water 
right,”148 although in Hage V the court distinguished between having title 
to the water and owning the right to use the water.149  The Hage V court 
noted that there is a “difference between water ownership and real 
property ownership; water is a usufructuary as opposed to a possessory 
right.”150  Nevertheless, the court held that “the Government’s 
construction of fences around the water and streams amounts to a 
physical taking during the time period in which Plaintiffs’ still had a 
grazing permit and their cattle had the right to water at these 
streams.”151  Thus, while the court distinguished water rights from real 
property ownership based upon its usufruct nature, it still found a 
private property right in water sufficient to support a takings claim.152 
The “contractually-conferred right to the use of water” was 
identified as property subject to a taking in Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage District v. United States.153  The Tulare court recognized that 
“under California law[,] the title to water always remains with the 
state,”154 but concluded “that plaintiffs’ right to the use of water is a 
compensable contractual right . . . .”155  The court determined that the 
“right to the use” of the water is a “physical taking” when the federal 
government preserved water to protect fish under the Endangered 
Species Act and “rendered the usufructuary right to that water 
valueless.”156 
A few years later in Casitas Municipal Water District v. United 
States,157 the Federal Circuit followed the Tulare decision to conclude 
that the diversion of water for a fish ladder was a permanent physical 
taking of water from Casitas.158  The Casitas decision did not directly 
address the issue of whether water rights are property rights because, for 
 
148. See Hage V, 82 Fed. Cl. at 210 (citing Hage IV, 51 Fed. Cl. at 576–80). 
149. Id. at 211. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 212. 
153. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314 (2001). 
154. Id. at 318 (citing CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (Deering 1977)). 
155. Id. at 318 n.6. 
156. Id. at 319 (finding a “physical taking” and comparing this denial of a right to use 
water to the invasion of air space above a landowner’s property that was found to be a taking 
in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946)). 
157. 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
158. Id. at 1296 (“The water, and Casitas’ right to use that water, is forever gone.”). 
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purposes of the summary judgment motion at issue in the case, the 
government “conceded that Casitas has a valid property right in the 
water in question.”159  However, the dissent in Casitas observed that 
“Casitas does not own the water in question because all water sources 
within California belong to the public,”160 and, since California subjects 
water rights permits to the public trust doctrine, there can be no takings 
claim if there is no property interest in the water.161  The dissent further 
opined that “because Casitas possesses a usufructuary interest in the 
water and does not actually own the water molecules at issue, it is 
difficult to imagine how its property interest in the water could be 
physically invaded or occupied.”162 
State law regarding property rights in water is similarly divergent.  
The Court of Federal Claims in Klamath Irrigation District v. United 
States recognized no property rights in water,163 except as created based 
upon contracts between the water users and the United States.164  Under 
Oregon law, the water users in Klamath were not allowed to assert a 
takings claim because they did not have a property right in the water 
and, thus, were restricted only to contract remedies.165  Nebraska law 
also appears to restrict private ownership of water rights.166  The 
Nebraska Supreme Court in Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Nebraska 
Department of Natural Resources (Spear II) did not reach the question 
of private ownership of water, but the court did hold that surface water 
users who were adversely impacted by groundwater withdrawals could 
not assert an inverse condemnation claim.167  Although the same court 
had stated in its earlier Spear I decision that “[a] right to appropriate 
 
159. Id. at 1288. 
160. Id. at 1297 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (citing CAL. WATER CODE §§ 102, 1001 (West 
1992)). 
161. Id. at 1297. 
162. Id. at 1298. 
163. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 540 (2005). 
164. Id. at 523–24 (noting that according to Oregon state law, the United States 
government held ownership title to the water). 
165. Id. at 540 (concluding that landowners have potential contract claims only as 
against the United States). 
166. See Zellmer & Harder, supra note 5, at 736–37 (noting that the Spear T Ranch, Inc. 
v. Knaub (Spear I), 691 N.W.2d 116, 127 (Neb. 2005), decision is problematic and that earlier 
Nebraska courts had concluded that surface water appropriators “did in fact possess vested 
property rights”). 
167. 699 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Neb. 2005) (finding that the government agency “did not have 
authority to regulate ground water users or administer ground water rights for the benefit of 
surface water appropriators”). 
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surface water however, is not an ownership of property” for purposes of 
supporting a claim for conversion or trespass,168 it based its Spear II 
takings claim denial on the government’s lack of a duty to act, rather 
than on the lack of a property interest held by the plaintiff water user.169  
Although many state and federal decisions have found water to be a 
compensable property interest, there remains great inconsistency as to 
the nature of this right.170 
While water rights have readily been considered property rights by 
some courts, grazing rights, granted by the federal government, are not 
considered property rights compensable under the Fifth Amendment.171  
For example, in Alves v. United States,172 the Federal Circuit relied on 
the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Fuller173 to find that 
neither grazing permits nor grazing preferences constitute a 
compensable property interest under the Fifth Amendment.174  In 
Sacramento Grazing Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, both grazing rights and 
water rights were at issue.175  The Court of Federal Claims determined 
that there is “no property right to forage,”176 but noted that “[u]nder 
New Mexico law, the right to use water is a property right separate and 
severable from a right to land”177 and entitles the water user to bring a 
claim that the United States Forest Service has taken a vested right to 
use range stock water.178  It is an interesting contrast that grazing rights 
are not compensable property rights, whereas water rights needed to 
raise the cattle are subject to a takings claim.179 
 
168. Spear I, 691 N.W.2d at 127. 
169. Spear II, 699 N.W.2d at 385. 
170. Zellmer & Harder, supra note 5, at 738 (“Outside of the navigational servitude 
context, the federal courts have been wildly inconsistent regarding takings claims brought by 
appropriators with state-sanctioned water rights.”); see also In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 
1087 (Or. 1924) (“No one has any property in the water itself, but a simple usufruct.”). 
171. Sacramento Grazing Ass’n v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 175, 189 (2010). 
172. 133 F.3d 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
173. 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973) (holding there are no compensable property rights in 
grazing permits issued under the Taylor Grazing Act). 
174. Alves, 133 F.3d at 1457. 
175. Sacramento Grazing Ass’n, 96 Fed. Cl. at 188. 
176. Id. at 189. 
177. Id. at 191. 
178. Id. at 190. 
179. Id. at 192 (citing Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 332 P.2d 
465, 471 (N.M. 1958), a New Mexico case which held “that water rights holders are ‘entitled 
to the waters . . . that flowed . . . at the time of their appropriation’”); see also Acton v. United 
States, 401 F.2d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 1968) (“Grazing permits create no interest or estate in 
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Rather than following the water law precedents, which generally 
established a property right for purposes of the Takings Clause, the 
fishing rights cases relied on the grazing decisions to hold that fishing 
permits are not property protected by the Fifth Amendment.180  Citing 
Fuller and Alves, the Federal Circuit in Conti v. United States found that 
the swordfishing permit at issue in Conti was similar to the grazing 
permits and thus did not constitute a property interest.181  The court 
declined to recognize “a property interest in the government’s 
discretionary decision not to exercise its explicitly granted authority to 
revoke, suspend, or modify the permit.”182  The Federal Circuit later 
extended the reasoning in Conti to the commercial fishing permits at 
issue in American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States.183  The court 
concluded “that American Pelagic did not and could not possess a 
property interest in its fishery permits”184 because, without the right to 
assign, sell, or transfer these permits, they held only a revocable license, 
not a property right.185 
Fishing rights were also compared to grazing rights in Palmyra 
Pacific Seafoods, L.L.C. v. United States186 and Organized Fishermen of 
Florida v. Watt,187 to find that no compensable property interest exists 
for these revocable licenses and permits.  In Palmyra, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed that in order to have a cause of action for a Fifth 
Amendment Taking, there must be a protectable property interest and a 
ban on fishing that results in a reduction of the value of a fishing license 
does not affect any compensable property interest.188  The Palmyra court 
discussed the Colvin Cattle case and used the Colvin holding that “the 
government’s prohibition on grazing did not constitute a taking of the 
 
public lands, only a privilege which may be withdrawn.”). 
180. Vanek v. Alaska Bd. of Fisheries, 193 P.3d 283, 292 (Alaska 2008) (“Although we 
have treated limited entry permits as property for other purposes such as inheritance and 
child support, the federal cases are persuasive in their reasoning that fishing permits do not 
confer property interests for the purposes of takings claims.”). 
181. Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Applying traditional 
notions of property and existing rules and understandings, we conclude that Mr. Conti’s 
swordfishing permit, like the grazing permits in Fuller and Alves, falls short of conferring a 
cognizable property interest.”). 
182. Id. at 1342 n.5. 
183. 379 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. 561 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
187. 590 F. Supp. 805, 815 (S.D. Fla. 1984). 
188. Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, 561 F.3d at 1367. 
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ranch owner’s property” to support its determination that “the 
government’s prohibition on commercial fishing in the waters 
surrounding Palmyra [did not take] their rights to run a commercial 
fishing operation on the island.”189  The court in Organized Fishermen of 
Florida v. Watt used grazing permit cases from the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuit Courts of Appeal to conclude that just as a grazing permit may 
be withdrawn by the government at any time without paying 
compensation, a commercial fishing permit may be restricted or 
cancelled without compensation because such permits are a privilege 
and, by nature, revocable.190 
Courts continue to uniformly find that fishing rights are not property 
interests compensable under the Fifth Amendment.191  Relying on a 
“wealth of federal precedent,”192 the court in Burns Harbor Fish Co. v. 
Ralston concluded that although a license might be property in relation 
to a third party193 and within the meaning of the Due Process Clause,194 
any necessary environmental restriction by Indiana is not a compensable 
Taking, and is merely “a cost of doing business.”195  The Burns Harbor 
court acknowledged that the State of Indiana was “the very entity that 
authorized Burns Harbor’s licenses to fish in the first instance” and that 
“the State which ‘giveth’ may take or limit a license in almost any 
reasonable way.”196 
The court of Federal Claims in Arctic King Fisheries, Inc. v. United 
States also pointed out that, in addition to the fact that fishing permits 
 
189. Id. (discussing Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
190. 590 F. Supp. at 815–16 (citing Pankey Land & Cattle Co. v. Hardin, 427 F.2d 43, 45 
(10th Cir. 1970); and Osborne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 1944)). 
191. See, e.g., Gen. Category Scallop Fishermen v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 720 
F. Supp. 2d 564, 576 (D.N.J. 2010) (“Holders of fishing permits issued pursuant to the 
Magnuson–Stevens Act do not possess a valid property interest in such permits.”); Gonzalez 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 695 F. Supp. 2d 474, 504 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (finding that plaintiffs 
did not “demonstrate a property interest with respect to the federal shrimping permits”); 
Burns Harbor Fish Co. v. Ralston, 800 F. Supp. 722, 726–27 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (confirming that 
fishing licenses are not property requiring protection under the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment); Douglas F. Britton, The Privatization of the American Fishery: Limitations, 
Recognitions, and the Public Trust, 3 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 217, 235 (1997) (“Historically 
speaking, fishermen have not been successful in their pursuit of takings claims for the 
compensation of restricted fishing rights or lost fisheries resources, mostly due to the 
historical treatment of fish, and the doctrine of res communes.”). 
192. Burns Harbor Fish Co., 800 F. Supp. at 727. 
193. Id. at 722, 728. 
194. Id. at 730. 
195. Id. at 728–29. 
196. Id. at 728. 
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have not been recognized as possessing sufficient property 
characteristics, there is a concern “that the government not be required 
to pay compensation for value that it created.”197  Similarly, water users 
originally granted the usufructuary right to water by the government 
should not be compensated for a taking when the government reduces 
or eliminates access to this public resource in order to protect its 
continuing value to all.198 
Even when fishing rights are viewed in the context of individual 
fishing quotas (IFQs) such that conferring a property interest would 
establish a market in the permits,199 “[i]t is also settled law that a license 
to perform an act upon public lands and waterways does not vest the 
holder with a permanent property right which, if revoked, is subject to 
compensation under the [T]akings [C]lause of the Fifth Amendment.”200  
The Magnuson–Stevens Act endorses this settled law and explicitly 
provides “that an IFQ is a revocable permit which does not confer any 
right to compensation if revoked or limited.”201 
Treating fishing rights as revocable licenses instead of property for 
purposes of the Takings Clause is not without its problems.  This settled 
law may create a disincentive for fishermen to invest in equipment and 
places the government in the dual position of being both a regulator for 
conservation purposes and a facilitator of those who will capture and 
sell these natural resources.202  Professor Josh Eagle argues that these 
conflicting roles will compromise the effectiveness of fishing regulation 
and, in combination with the fisherman’s incentive to fight conservation, 
 
197. Arctic King Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 360, 371 (2004) (citing 
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493 (1973)). 
198. See Leshy, supra note 137, at 2022–23 (observing that “the nation’s taxpayers have 
been bestowing gifts on farmers for decades” and it would be anomalous to require the 
taxpayers to compensate the farmers when it decides to “end the gift-giving”); see also 
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 563 (2001) (“Any 
government redistribution of private property necessarily involves givings and takings, and 
any government destruction of property can be matched with a government creation of 
property.”). 
199. See Britton, supra note 191, at 247–48 (discussing the property characteristics of 
individual fishing quotas, but observing that they are only recognized as a privilege that can 
be revoked). 
200. See Mannina, supra note 128, at 49. 
201. Id. at 50; see also John A. Duff, Offshore Management Considerations: Law and 
Policy Questions Related to Fish, Oil, and Wind, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 385, 390–91 
(2004) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(4) (2000) and noting that “the government protected itself 
against a future claim that any restriction or abolition of the interest should be compensable 
as a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment”). 
202. Eagle, supra note 9, at 624. 
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the Magnuson–Stevens Act will not achieve its goal of sustainable 
fisheries unless it is changed to account for these concerns.203 
Besides causing difficulty with investment security and 
sustainability,204 the failure to recognize a fisherman’s property rights in 
fishery resources has also limited tort damages for private individuals 
suffering economic losses due to negligent damage to natural 
resources.205  The holding in the seminal maritime case of Robins Dry 
Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,206 “has been interpreted to mean that in 
order for a plaintiff to recover for economic losses, the plaintiff must 
hold a property interest in what is damaged . . . .”207  In the Ninth Circuit, 
however, commercial fishermen have recovered economic losses for 
damages to fishery resources caused by pollution or oil spills under what 
has been called the Oppen Exception, even though the fishermen “do 
not possess a private property interest in the fisheries . . . .”208 
Finally, while fishing licenses and IFQs are not considered property 
for a Fifth Amendment takings claim,209 they may be recognized as 
property for other purposes.  For example, several cases recognize a 
property interest for the purposes of procedural due process claims.  In 
order to assert a procedural due process claim, there must be a 
protectable liberty or property interest and a denial of adequate 
procedural protection.210  While courts have acknowledged that fishing 
permits are not considered property for some purposes, they have 
allowed due process challenges when permit holders allege they have 
 
203. See id. at 644–45. 
204. See, e.g., Kacy A. Collons, Comment, ITQS as Collateral Rightly Understood: 
Preserving Commerce and Conserving Fisheries, 14 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 285, 321 
(1996) (concluding that making ITQs compensable property rights subject to takings claims 
would make them more attractive to lenders, but would also severely limit the government’s 
ability to adjust these rights to achieve conservation goals). 
205. Britton, supra note 191, at 225. 
206. 275 U.S. 303 (1927). 
207. Britton, supra note 191, at 224. 
208. Id. at 225–26 (stating that Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th 1974), created 
the Oppen exception). 
209. See Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 
Gen. Category Scallop Fishermen v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 720 F. Supp. 2d 564, 
576 (D.N.J. 2010) (noting that there is no property interest in a scallop fishing permit); 
Gonzalez v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 695 F. Supp. 2d 474, 504 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (holding that 
plaintiffs did not show they had a property interest in federal shrimping permits subject to a 
Fifth Amendment Taking). 
210. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–71 (1972). 
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suffered a deprivation without proper process.211  Fishing licenses and 
permits have also been considered property for purposes of attaching 
tax liens212 and dividing marital property interests.213 
The issue of property rights in natural resources needs to be 
governed by a uniform principle, but private property ownership is not 
the appropriate model for all resources.  Fish and water resources are 
particularly difficult to treat as private property because of the 
difficulties of excluding non-owners, their migratory nature, and their 
interconnectedness with other ecosystems.  To elaborate, 
 
It is fairly easy to assign and enforce property rights to some 
resources and ecosystems such as agricultural fields, trees or a 
lake because excluding non-owners from using the resource is 
fairly straightforward.  However, it is much more difficult to 
assign and enforce property rights to resources such as 
migrating fish populations, biological diversity, nutrient cycles, 
water cycles, and many other ecological services.  The reason is 
that it is either too expensive or literally impossible to exclude 
non-owners from using these resources and services, partly 
because they are highly interconnected with other ecosystems 
thereby transcending several property rights regimes.214 
 
211. See, e.g., Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“[F]or procedural due process purposes, [plaintiff] has a protectible property interest in 
receiving the IFQ permit.”); LaBauve v. La. Wildlife & Fisheries Comm’n, 444 F. Supp. 1370, 
1378–79 (E.D. La. 1978) (noting that although the Louisiana Supreme Court does not 
recognize a property interest in a fishing license, the plaintiff had an interest sufficient to 
receive due process of law before deprivation); Mertins v. Comm’r of Natural Res., 755 
N.W.2d 329, 336–37 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (observing that some jurisdictions do not 
recognize a property interest in fishing permits, but holding that commercial fishing licenses 
are sufficient interests to be characterized “as property interests entitled to procedural-due-
process protection under the Minnesota and U.S. Constitutions”). 
212. See Jon David Weiss, A Taxing Issue: Are Limited Entry Fishing Permits Property?, 
9 ALASKA L. REV. 93, 112 (1992) (concluding that because fishing permit holders may easily 
transfer entry permits, these permits may be considered property subject to a federal tax 
lien). 
213. See, e.g., Edelman v. Edelman, 3 P.3d 348, 352 (Alaska 2000) (upholding lower 
court finding that the fishing permit at issue was husband’s separate property and not part of 
the marital estate); McGee v. McGee, 974 P.2d 983, 989 (Alaska 1999) (upholding lower court 
treatment of fishing quota shares as divisible marital property); Johns v. Johns, 945 P.2d 1222, 
1226 (Alaska 1997) (upholding trial court’s finding that husband’s Individual Fishing Quotas 
(IFQs) are marital property); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 928 P.2d 597, 600 (Alaska 1996) (holding 
that IFQs distributed during marriage are divisible marital property). 
214. Craig, supra note 103, at 372 (quoting Robert Costanza, The Ecological, Economic, 
and Social Importance of the Oceans, 31 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 199, 204 (1999)). 
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As we find ourselves in a world of scarcity, regulation of these 
resources at the local, national, and international levels is needed to 
control overexploitation and a tragedy of the commons.  This issue has 
the potential for a sweeping impact on environmental cases.  The 
potential can be illustrated by a recent international case involving 
lobsters poached from South African waters: United States v. Bengis.215  
In Bengis, the Second Circuit held that South Africa “has a property 
interest in rock lobsters unlawfully harvested from its waters.”216  
However, the court based this holding not by finding lobsters to be 
property, but rather by finding that since South Africa had the right to 
seize and sell lobsters captured in excess of legal limits, it had a property 
right in the revenue from lobsters taken illegally.217  Even though the 
United States government argued in its briefs that “South Africa’s 
interest in the wild lobsters was a res publicae or public trust interest and 
that such an interest qualified as a property interest under [U.S.] 
restitution statutes . . . the [court] did not reach that issue, [and] instead 
focused on the already-poached lobster.”218  Thus, finding a unifying 
principle for property rights in environmental resources is still 
undecided, but the public trust doctrine continues to emerge as a 
promising contender. 
The public trust doctrine was first applied to navigable waters in 
Arnold v. Mundy, where the plaintiff brought a trespass action against 
the defendant who harvested oysters from the plaintiff’s oyster bed.219  
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not prevail 
because the public has rights to fish in navigable waters, which belong to 
the state and cannot be granted to private interests.220  “Trust purposes 
were traditionally confined to navigation, commerce, and fisheries, but 
later held to include recreation and preservation of trust lands in their 
natural state.”221  The public trust doctrine has more recently been 
 
215. 631 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2011). 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 40. 
218. E-mail from Michael B. Gerrard, Andrew Sabin Professor of Prof’l Practice, Dir., 
Ctr. for Climate Change Law, Columbia Law Sch., to Michael Kidd, Faculty of Law, Univ. of 
KwaZulu-Natal (Feb. 3, 2011, 11:40 EST) (quoting, with permission, Marcus Asner of the 
S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney’s Office) (on file with author). 
219. 6 N.J.L. 1, 7–8 (1821). 
220. Id. at 11. 
221. Christian L. Marsh & Peter S. Prows, California’s New Water Legislation: A Bucket 
of Reform or But a Drop?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Fall 2010, at 37, 38. 
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extended by California and Hawaii to include water resources.222  Both 
nationally and internationally, the concept of public ownership of fish 
and water resources, as governed by the public trust doctrine, seems to 
be the most viable framework. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Water allocation considerations must take into account habitat 
preservation, impacts on endangered species in relation to insufficient 
stream water, full utilization of available water, and allocation fairness 
based on a variable water supply resulting from weather and climate 
shifts.  Equipment modernization and water-treatment method 
improvement may also impact how much water is sent downstream to 
junior right holders if senior appropriators invest in new equipment.223  
Continued damage to the ecosystems from overexploitation of 
resources, the growing demand for the resources, the uncertainty of 
supply, and the improving capture technology are challenges that 
require government intervention in allocation decisions. 
Water and fishing rights may also conflict with each other as water is 
appropriated and redirected through the building of dams, such that fish 
and fish habitats are destroyed and there is a loss of fishing rights 
because of that destruction.224  When rivers are dammed or overdrawn, 
the fish population is decimated as a result.225  Tribal, commercial, and 
 
222. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983); In re Water Use Permit Applications 
(Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000); see also Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative 
Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and 
State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2007) (discussing the impacts that 
California public trust cases, including Mono Lake, have had on the attitudes of eastern states 
in considering an expansion of their “public trust philosophies”). 
223. See, e.g., Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1773, 1779 (2011) (concluding that 
Wyoming did not breach the Yellowstone River Compact by using more efficient irrigation 
methods, which reduced the downstream flow to Montana because, under the plain terms of 
the Compact and the doctrine of appropriation, Montana was not guaranteed a set quantity of 
water and because Wyoming is allowed to switch to the more efficient sprinkler irrigation “so 
long as no additional water is diverted from the stream and the conserved water is used on the 
same acreage for the same agricultural purpose as before”). 
224. See Starla Kay Roels, Borrowing Instead of Taking: How the Seemingly Opposite 
Threads of Indian Treaty Rights and Property Rights Activism Could Intertwine To Restore 
Salmon to the Rivers, 28 ENVTL. L. 375, 390 (1998) (“Just as the government deprived the 
Causbys of the use of their property by destroying the beneficial ownership of property [as a 
chicken farm], tribes cannot make use of their property because hydroelectric dams have 
essentially destroyed the beneficial ownership of treaty fishing rights.” (citing United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259, 267 (1946))). 
225. See Marsh & Prows, supra note 221, at 38. 
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recreational fishermen have had no recourse against the government for 
resulting losses when the fish population is devastated because the loss 
in fishing rights are not considered compensable property under the 
Fifth Amendment.  Conversely, when the government takes action to 
restore fisheries by building fish ladders or requiring that water be left in 
streams to support fish habitat, water users are treated as property 
owners in most state and federal courts and may bring takings claims for 
the deprivation of compensable water rights. 
This dichotomy in treating water rights as property and fishing rights 
as revocable licenses is only defensible based on case precedent that 
developed along independent strands.  The fishing rights cases relied on 
grazing rights cases, with the American Pelagic decision holding that no 
property right exists in uncaptured fish.  Meanwhile, the water rights 
cases relied on the real property ownership model to find property 
rights in projected water availability, even though such water rights are 
considered to be usufructuary in nature.  Water and fish are natural 
resources that should be governed by the public trust doctrine in similar 
forms.  When the state grants rights of access to these resources, the 
rights must be considered revocable licenses subject to the state’s 
responsibility to manage and conserve those resources.  For the public 
good, the state must be able to take back those access rights it has 
previously granted, without having to pay just compensation. 
 
